Talking to journalists in a crisis: The Bonnesen Case

In April 2026, the Swedish Supreme Court delivered a judgement with significant practical implications for listed companies and their executives. The case arose during the years 2017-2019, when problems with money laundering at several Nordic banks attracted intense public and media attention. At the time, Birgitte Bonnesen was the CEO of Swedbank, and in that capacity she made statements about the bank's anti-money laundering measures in its Estonian operations during media interviews. The Court of Appeal convicted her of aggravated fraud and sentenced her to one year and three months' imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed that judgement ant acquitted her in full.

The basis for the acquittal was the constitutional right of informants (Sw. meddelarfriheten) under the Freedom of the Press Act (Sw. tryckfrihetsförordningen) and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of the Expression (Sw. yttrandefrihetsgrundlagen). The judgement is a landmark ruling at the intersection of Swedish constitutional law and capital markets regulation – with direct relevance for listed companies and their approach to crisis communications. As one leading commentator has observed, it is a sensible and, moreover, business-friendly decision.

The money laundering controversy that engulfed several European banks during 2017-2019 revealed that many institutions had not maintained adequate anti-money laundering controls. Like many of their peers, Swedbank and its representatives sought to address the intense media interest that followed. Brigitte Bonnesen gave a series of interviews in which she answered critical questions from journalists about Swedbank's Estonian operations.

In an interview in Svenska Dagbladet on 23 October 2018, she asked what the bank had found when reviewing its transactions with Danske Bank for the period 2007-2015 and answered: "We found nothing. We have reviewed all the customers who were mentioned in the media's reporting on Danske Bank and none of them are, or have been, customers of Swedbank. Not a single one." In an interview with TT on the same date, she was asked whether the bank had seen anything more in the Baltics, and replied: "No, we have not."

It subsequently emerged that Swedbank's compliance function had indications that, during 2007-2015, there had been extensive suspicious money laundering transactions between customers in Swedbank's Estonian operations and counterpart customers in Danske Bank's Estonian operations. The Court of Appeal found that Birgitte Bonnesen had provided misleading information in those interviews and convicted her of aggravated fraud. The Supreme Court took a different view.

The case gives rise to criminal liability under two parallel provisions: an older provision of the Criminal Code Chapter 9, Section 9, and the more recent EU-law prohibition on market manipulation in Articles 12 and 15 of the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). Both carry the same penalty range and were assessed side by side.

The Supreme Court noted that the starting point under Swedish constitutional law is freedom of expression – a fundamental right under both the Freedom of the Press Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression. The purpose of these constitutional laws is to ensure a free exchange of opinion, free and comprehensive information, and free artistic creation. Under the so-called exclusivity principle, criminal liability for statements made in a constitutionally protected context requires explicit support in the constitutional provisions themselves; ordinary legislation does not suffice.

The right of informants means that anyone is free to communicate information on any subject for the purpose of publication – for example in a newspaper or broadcast – and that the person who does so is in principle exempt from criminal and civil liability. The only exceptions are the narrowly defined breach of source confidentiality: primarily offences against national security such as treason, high treason, and espionage.

The Court identified several features of the interview setting that were decisive. The statements consisted of answers to questions put to Birgitte Bonnesen in two relatively brief interviews – in both cases, answers to investigative journalistic questions about money laundering in Swedbank's Estonian operations. Birgitte Bonnesen had limited time for reflection, and editorial responsibility for the interviews lay with the journalists and their editorial offices. Crucially, there was nothing to indicate that Birgitte Bonnesen's purpose in participating in the interviews had been to use them as a vehicle for spreading misleading information that would influence the market's assessment of Swedbank.

The interviews therefore formed part of journalistic activity and fell within the scope of the constitutional freedom of expression laws. Birgitte Bonnesen's answers to the questions put to her were accordingly protected by the right of informants, and the charges of aggravated fraud and market manipulation were dismissed on that ground alone.

The judgement has direct relevance for listed companies, boards, and senior executives.

Answering journalists is constitutionally protected. When an executive's answers to journalists form part of journalistic activity and fall within the purposes of freedom of expression, those answers are protected by the right of informants – a complete constitutional bar to criminal prosecution. This applies even where the content of the answers later proves to be inaccurate, and even where the statements could affect the market's view of the company. Business leaders must, of course, think carefully about what they say and should always strive to be truthful. But they need not fear criminal punishment for their answers to probing journalists – unless they are deliberately lying with the purpose of influencing the share price.

Context is decisive. The Supreme Court attached weight to the investigative journalistic character of the questions, the ordinary interview setting, the limited time for reflection, and the absence of any indication that the CEO used the interviews as a vehicle for spreading misleading information. These are features of most media interviews, and the judgement therefore has broad practical application.

A complete acquittal on constitutional grounds – not a narrow factual ruling. The Supreme Court did not examine whether the statements were in fact misleading, or what Birgitte Bonnesen knew at the time. The charges were dismissed already on the constitutional ground. This makes the decision a principled ruling with wide reach, rather than a narrow or fact-specific outcome.

The Nordic dimension. While foreign judgements do not bind Norwegian or Danish courts, a well-reasoned decision of this kind – delivered at the highest judicial level, on EU rules that are identical across jurisdictions – may also inspire domestic courts and authorities in Denmark and Norway when applying the same MAR provisions. Listed companies across the Nordic region should therefore take note.

The separate charge regarding the shareholder meeting. Both the district court and the Court of Appeal acquitted her on the basis that the information disclosed was neither sufficiently concrete nor specific to constitute inside information. This aspect of the case is a useful reminder that how and to whom information is communicated remains critically important – the constitutional protection that applied to the press interviews did not extend to the private shareholder meeting.

Three points stand out for listed companies and their legal advisers.

First, when an executive answers journalist's questions in an ordinary interview setting, those answers form part of journalistic activity and are protected by the right of informants. This constitutional protection bars criminal prosecution without any examination of whether the statements were accurate – but it presupposes that the interview was not deliberately used as a vehicle for spreading misleading information to influence the market. This is a significant and business-friendly clarification.

Second, the judgement rests on Swedish constitutional law and does not directly alter the substantive obligations under MAR or other securities law, including the rules on inside information, selective disclosure, and the broader prohibition on market manipulation. The Bonnesen judgement does not change what may lawfully be communicated – it addresses the criminal liability consequences when communication takes place in a journalistic context.

Third, the constitutional protection is forum-specific. It applied to the media interviews but not to the private shareholder meeting, where different rules governed. This has direct practical consequences: the same information shared in a press interview and a shareholder briefing may carry fundamentally different criminal law consequences. Companies operating across the Nordic region should also obtain local advice on equivalent protections in their respective jurisdictions.