New judgement from the Court of Justice of the European Union - Case C 110/24

The case in the main proceedings concerned Spanish biodiversity workers carrying out conservation work in natural micro-reserves in Spain. The workers travelled from their respective homes to a designated base, being a fixed reference point situated in a municipality within the natural areas where the work was to be performed, using their own means of transport and were required to arrive at 08:00. From base, the workers were transported collectively in a company vehicle, driven by one of the employees and equipped with the necessary tools and equipment, to the designated work site within the micro-reserve.

Upon completion of work at 15:00, the workers were transported back to base in the company vehicle. Subsequently, the workers travelled home using their own means of transport. The employer treated the morning journey from the base to the work site as working time for the purposes of calculating hours worked, but did not treat the return journey from the work site to the base as working time. The trade union brought collective proceedings challenging this practice, contending that both journeys should be classified as working time.

The referring court asked whether time spent travelling in the company’s vehicle at the beginning and end of the working day from the base to the micro-reserve or work site at which they carry out their duties and from there to the base constitutes “working time” within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time (the "Directive"). As regards the wording of point 1 of Article 2 of the Directive, the concept of "working time" is defined as "any period during which the worker is working, at the employer’s disposal and carrying out his activity or duties": 

1. As pertains to the first element, the CJEU referred to case C‑266/14 (Tyco), and stated that the travel arrangements of the biodiversity workers concerned are made by their employer, which designates, inter alia, the means of transport to be used for that journey, its point of departure and return, the time of departure of that journey and its destination, namely a work site. In those circumstances, such journeys must be regarded as inextricably linked to their status as biodiversity workers and therefore inherent in the exercise of their activity. Consequently, the CJEU held that the workers are carrying out their activity or duties during the travelling time, at the beginning and at the end of the working day. 
    
2. As regards the second element, the CJEU held that the decisive factor is that the worker is required to be physically present at the place determined by the employer and to be available to the employer in order to be able to provide the appropriate services immediately in case of need.  Conversely, it is apparent from case-law that the possibility for workers to manage their time without major constraints and to pursue their own interests is a factor capable of demonstrating that the period of time in question does not constitute working time. The CJEU held that during the necessary travelling time, which generally cannot be shortened, the workers concerned are not able to use their time freely and pursue their own interests, so that, consequently, they are at their employer’s disposal. 
    
3. Finally, as regards to the third element, according to which the worker must be working during the period under consideration, the CJEU emphasized that travelling is an integral part of being a worker without a fixed or habitual place of work, and that the workers are carrying out their duties when travelling from base to work site. 
    

In light of the foregoing, the CJEU concluded that time spent at the beginning and end of the workday from base to the micro-reserve or work site and from there to the base constitutes “working time" within the meaning of the Directive. 

The ruling aligns with recent judgments of the CJEU, the EFTA Court and the Norwegian Supreme Court. Where travel time constitutes a necessary prerequisite for employees to discharge their contractual duties, and such travel cannot be shortened, employees are unable to freely and uninterruptedly pursue their own interests during that period. Such travel time constitutes "working time" within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the Directive and Section 10-1 of the Norwegian Working Environment Act.

It is settled case law that the purpose of the Directive is to lay down minimum health and safety requirements for the organization of working time. The Directive harmonizes national rules concerning, in particular, the duration of working time. Its purpose is to ensure minimum daily and weekly rest periods, breaks and maximum weekly working time. Common to all the decisions handed down by the European Court of Justice, EFTA Court and the Supreme Court of Norway in recent years is that the travel time has been crucial for the employees to carry out their activity and/or duties in the employment relationship. In addition, the travel time has solely been executed in the interest of the employer. In such cases, health and safety considerations have been given substantial weight by the courts. 

The situation may, however, be argued to be different if the travel time is not required or considered necessary by the employer. In Case 87/14, the CJEU ruled on whether certain parts of the training program for junior doctors should be regarded as working time. It was not disputed that the relationship between the junior doctors and their educational institution was not related to their employment relationship, but it was claimed that the training program was an integral part of the work. As the employees in question were not physically present at the place determined by the employer when attending the training program, the CJEU concluded that the requirements of working time within the meaning of the Directive were not met. 

It must also be noted that travel between an employee's residence and a fixed workplace falls outside the definition of working time. This distinction is justified as employees retain control over commuting distance through residential choice, and such travel does not form part of the execution of their employment obligations. 

If you have any questions regarding the implications of the judgment for your organization or travel time in general, please feel free to contact us.