Schjødt Nordic Competition Outlook

On 30 April 2026, the European Commission (EC) published draft revised Merger Guidelines for public consultation, marking the broadest review of EU merger rules in over two decades. The draft covers the EC's approach to both horizontal and non-horizontal mergers, superseding the separate guidelines that have governed those assessments since 2004 and 2008 respectively. The guidelines serve as a practical rulebook explaining how the EC evaluates whether a proposed merger between two companies could damage competition in the EU, for example, by reducing consumer choice or pushing up prices.

The current guidelines have been in place for decades, and the EC takes the view that they no longer fully reflect the realities of today's economy. Developments such as the rise of digital markets, shifting global trade patterns, and the transition to a greener economy have fundamentally changed how many industries operate. The revised guidelines are intended to capture these shifts. Stakeholders are invited to submit feedback until 26 June 2026, and a workshop is planned for 10 June 2026. The EC aims to finalise the revised guidelines by the end of 2026.

Takeaway: The draft guidelines reflect the broader policy debate on European competitiveness and whether EU competition rules have at times made it harder for European companies to achieve the scale necessary to compete with global rivals. Whilst the draft does not alter the primary objective of EU merger control or the substantive test to prohibit a merger, it signals a shift in emphasis. Industrial scale, investment capacity, and global competitiveness are now expressly recognised as relevant factors in the merger assessment. Whether this recalibration will in practice give merging parties more traction for efficiency and scale arguments – and how the EC will balance those considerations against competitive harm – will only become clear as the guidelines are applied in individual cases.

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Both Apple and Google have submitted formal commitments to the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) under the UK's new Strategic Market Status regime - a framework that allows the CMA to impose binding obligations on large technology companies deemed to hold an entrenched position in key digital markets, without the need to prove a competition infringement. Google's commitments address concerns regarding Play's app review, app ranking, and use of third-party developer data, requiring that these functions operate fairly, objectively, and transparently. Google has also committed not to using non-public Play data to support the development of its first-party apps, and to provide both public transparency reports and confidential compliance reporting to the CMA. Apple's commitments cover equivalent areas within the App Store ecosystem, including app review, search, use of third-party developer data, and the handling of interoperability requests for iOS and iPadOS.

Takeaway: The parallel commitments from Apple and Google illustrate how the SMS regime operates in practice, enabling the CMA to secure binding, sector-specific behavioural obligations from designated platform operators without the finding of a competition law infringement.

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The Swedish Competition Authority (SCA) has closed an investigation of the Swedish Golf Federation's (SGF) membership cap. In April 2025, SGF amended its statutes to introduce a cap on the number of active Golf IDs that golf clubs may issue to players, set at 2,800 for 18-hole courses and 1,680 for 9-hole courses. Following complaints from four golf clubs and an industry association alleging infringement of the prohibition on anti-competitive cooperation and abuse of a dominant position, the SCA opened a formal investigation. In October 2025, the SGF decided not to implement the second stage of the cap, and in February 2026 tabled a revised proposal to raise the cap levels and extend the implementation timeline. Against this backdrop, the SCA decided to close its investigation without the finding of an infringement, concluding that most clubs will retain room to grow their membership and that overall market capacity continues to exceed demand. The SCA emphasised, however, that its closing decision does not constitute a finding that the SGF's conduct is compatible with competition law.

Takeaway: The case illustrates the SCA's focus on bringing competition problems to an end, rather than imposing fines. It demonstrates how proactive revision of measures under scrutiny can influence the course of a competition investigation.

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On 22 April 2026, the Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA) approved the sale of the Locobase skincare brand, concluding its review of Karo Healthcare's acquisition of Aco Hud Nordic. When the NCA initially examined the deal, it found that the combination of the two companies risked harming competition in the market for medicated skincare products in the Nordic region. To address these concerns, Karo Healthcare offered to divest the Locobase brand across the Nordic countries as a condition for obtaining clearance. The NCA has now confirmed that the agreed buyer meets the requirements of being an independent and suitable new market participant, and observed that the entry of a new operator into the medicated skincare market with a clear intention to compete represents a positive competitive outcome. With the divestment now approved, the deal has received full clearance.

Takeaway: The case is a textbook example of how structural remedies, where the merging parties agree to sell off part of the business, can allow a deal to proceed while preserving competition in affected markets.

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On 13 April 2026, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (DCCA) announced that Arla Foods had withdrawn its notification to acquire Them Andelsmejeri, bringing the merger review to a close without a formal decision. The DCCA had been examining the proposed deal for some time and had raised serious concerns that it would harm competition across a number of markets within the Danish dairy sector. In particular, the DCCA found that the merger would risk pushing up prices on firm and hard cheeses, which together account for around half of all cheese consumption in Denmark, and that competition in the market for Danbo cheese and similar varieties would be especially affected. Danbo is widely consumed in Denmark and has even been described as the country's national cheese. According to the DCCA, Arla holds a significant presence in the Danish dairy sector, including access to raw milk, and found that acquiring Them, would further consolidate that position. Arla ultimately chose to abandon the transaction.

Takeaway: The case highlights the particular scrutiny that competition authorities apply when a transaction would eliminate one of the few remaining close rivals of a well-established player in the relevant markets. It also serves as a reminder that intensive regulatory scrutiny alone may be sufficient to derail a deal, even without the authority issuing a formal prohibition.

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