Norway, Sweden, Denmark, UK

Schjødt Nordic Competition Outlook

Published:

EU Competition Flags 2

Volume 26 Issue 7

This newsletter highlights significant developments in competition law, FDI and related regulatory areas across Schjødt's core jurisdictions: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the European Union and the United Kingdom. Each issue features a selected highlight from each jurisdiction, examining key enforcement actions, judicial decisions and regulatory initiatives that are shaping the legal landscape. 

1. EU – MERGER CONTROL AND DIGITAL MARKETS ACT: COMMISSION CLEARS PARAMOUNT/WARNER MERGER WITH REMEDIES AND FINES GOOGLE UNDER THE DMA

On 22 July 2026, the European Commission ("Commission") approved Paramount Skydance Corporation's proposed acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery, conditional upon full compliance with the commitments offered by Paramount. Both companies are active in the production and distribution of theatrical and audiovisual content.

The Commission found that sufficient competition would remain at film production level but identified concerns at film distribution level: the transaction would have added Warner's film portfolio to the joint venture United International Pictures (UIP), through which Paramount and Universal jointly distribute films to cinema operators in 19 EEA countries. The Commission considered that this could lead to higher concentration and increased transparency, with less favourable rental and distribution terms for cinema operators as a possible result.

To address these concerns, Paramount committed to terminate its stake in UIP within 13 months of closing and, for ten years, not to jointly co-distribute films with Universal in the EEA or to shift film distribution to a distributor shared with Universal or Disney in the relevant countries. The Commission concluded that, as modified by these commitments, the transaction would no longer raise competition concerns.

On 23 July 2026, the Commission issued two decisions finding that Google had not complied with the Digital Markets Act (DMA), resulting in fines totaling €890 million. The DMA applies to "gatekeepers", large digital platforms such as Google, and imposes specific obligations on how they must treat their own services compared to those of competitors.

The first fine, of €460 million, concerned so-called "self-preferencing": the DMA requires gatekeepers to rank services on an equal footing, but the Commission found that Google displayed its own services, such as shopping, hotels, transport and sports results, more prominently in Google Search results than equivalent third-party services, for example at the top of the page or with enhanced visuals, without applying the same treatment to competitors.

The second fine, of €430 million, concerned so-called "anti-steering": the DMA requires that app developers using Google Play must be able to tell their customers about cheaper alternatives, for example on a website or another app store, and direct them there free of charge. The Commission found that the fees applied by Google for enabling this were so high and long-lasting that they discouraged developers from doing so in practice, even though it is formally allowed.

Google has been ordered to bring both instances of non-compliance to an end.

Takeaway: The two decisions illustrate two different tools the Commission uses to address market power in digital and content markets: structural remedies in merger control, and direct enforcement of behavioural obligations under the DMA.

In Paramount/Warner, the Commission's concerns were confined to the distribution-level joint venture rather than the production level, and were addressed through a combination of structural and behavioural elements: a full exit from that joint venture, together with a ten-year restriction on future co-distribution with Universal or Disney, suggesting the divestment alone was not sufficient.

The Google decisions confirm that DMA enforcement can result in substantial financial penalties, covering both the ranking of a gatekeeper's own services and the design of fees that affect steering to alternative purchase channels.

Read more here (Paramount / Warner) and here (Google).

2. UK – CMA ANNUAL REPORT AND COURT OF APPEAL RULING ON EXCESSIVE PRICING

On 1 July 2026, the Competition and Markets Authority ("CMA") published its annual report and accounts for 2025 to 2026, together with a new 2026-2029 strategy. A central theme of the report is the continued development of the strategic market status (SMS) regime: SMS is a designation the CMA can give to a firm it considers to hold substantial and entrenched market power in a digital activity, which then allows the CMA to impose tailored conduct requirements on that firm. The CMA confirmed that it has made three SMS designations to date and has opened a new SMS investigation into Microsoft's business software ecosystem, including cloud licensing.

On 28 July 2026, the Court of Appeal upheld the CMA's and the Competition Appeal Tribunal's (CAT) earlier findings that hydrocortisone tablet prices charged by Auden Mckenzie and Actavis UK between 2008 and 2018 were excessive and unfair, in a case that had originally resulted in penalties of GBP 266 million. The Court of Appeal dismissed the firms' appeals on the merits, meaning all of the CMA's infringement findings in the case have now been upheld on appeal, while separately remitting the question of the penalty amount to the CAT for further consideration on procedural grounds.

Takeaway: The Annual Report illustrates the continued development of the SMS regime and the CMA's ongoing focus on this area, both through the designations made to date and through the opening of new investigations. As the regime extends into further sectors, it remains to be seen how its scope and practical application will continue to evolve.

Moreover, the hydrocortisone judgment is a reminder that competition law cases can take many years to reach a final resolution, with different elements of a decision, such as the underlying findings and the penalty amount, sometimes being settled at different stages of the appeals process.

Read more here (Annual report) and here (Hydrocortisone judgment).

3. SWEDEN – SCA CLOSES DIGITAL PROPERTY ADVERTISING AND ISSUES UPDATED MERGER CONTROL GUIDANCE

The Swedish Competition Authority (SCA) has closed its investigation into whether property search service Hemnet's two commercial initiatives, targeting property sellers and involving partnerships with estate agent chains and franchisors, raised concerns under the prohibition on abuse of a dominant position.

In December, Hemnet introduced two initiatives: the "Sell first, pay later" payment option for property sellers advertising on Hemnet, which included a condition that the property be published on Hemnet within two days of first appearing on the estate agent's own website (a "two-day condition"); and strategic partnerships with estate agent chains and franchisors. The SCA opened an investigation into whether the two-day condition, combined with the partnerships, could affect competition in the growing "pre-market" for property sales.

In May, Hemnet ran a summer campaign offering the payment option without the two-day condition, and confirmed in early July that the condition would not be reinstated once the campaign ends. In light of this, the SCA considers there are currently insufficient indications of competitive harm to justify continued investigation.

Separately, ahead of new powers taking effect on 1 August 2026, the SCA has published updated guidance on the notification and assessment of concentrations, intended to increase predictability and help parties engage effectively. The new powers include a power for the SCA to order an information obligation for concentrations that are not otherwise notifiable under the merger rules, widening the SCA's scope to identify and review deals before completion.

Read more here (Hemnet) and here (new Merger Guidelines).

Takeaway: The Hemnet case is a reminder that the SCA continues to monitor how commercial terms and partnership structures interact in fast-evolving digital marketplaces, particularly where a market segment – here, the property pre-market – is still developing.

Furthermore, from now on, the SCA can order companies to provide information on non-notifiable concentrations, allowing it to review acquisitions and partnerships before they are completed, including acquisitions and partnership structures in sectors, such as digital platforms and marketplaces, where turnover can be low relative to market position or strategic significance.

Taken together, the two items suggest that fast-growing digital segments may increasingly be a focus area for the SCA, both from a conduct and a merger control perspective. Such segments often feature businesses whose market position is not reflected in turnover, which is precisely the gap the new information obligation is designed to close.

4. NORWAY – NCA CLEARS ELKJØP'S ACQUISITION OF EPLEHUSET FOLLOWING IN-DEPTH REVIEW AND APPOINTS NEW CHIEF ECONOMIST

On 30 July 2026, the NCA cleared Elkjøp's acquisition of Eplehuset, both retailers of Apple products including Mac and iPad devices to private customers. The NCA issued a 70-working-day notice on 29 June 2026 indicating that a prohibition could be forthcoming, citing concerns for competition in that segment, but concluded after further submissions and analysis from the parties that there was insufficient basis to block the transaction.

Also, the NCA has appointed Professor Øyvind Thomassen, currently a professor at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) and a competition economist with an academic career spanning KU Leuven, the University of Oxford, Seoul National University and NHH, as its new Chief Economist, effective from 1 October.

Takeaway: The Elkjøp/Eplehuset outcome is a useful illustration of how the NCA may weigh new evidence submitted after a statement of objections: substantial additional information from the parties was enough to move the case from a likely prohibition to a clearance.

Whether the new Chief Economist's appointment translates into a shift in the NCA's policy or analytical approach remains an open question worth following.

Read more here (Elkjøp / Eplehuset) and here (New Chief Economist).

5. DENMARK – DCCA FINDS OBSTRUCTION OF A DAWN RAID AND GUN-JUMPING IN BREACH OF MERGER CONTROL RULES

On 7 July 2026, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (DCCA) issued a decision concerning JobTeam A/S in connection with an unannounced dawn raid. During the inspection, more than 5,000 items, including a large volume of emails, were deleted from the company's IT system by an employee; JobTeam informed the DCCA of this during the inspection. The DCCA completed the inspection, secured the data, and recovered the deleted items. The DCCA has stated that it intends to request the court to impose a fine, as the DCCA cannot impose a fine itself.

Furthermore, on 8 July 2026, the DCCA issued a decision concerning Brødr. Ewers A/S's acquisition of sole control over Hjaltelin ApS and Hjaltelin Pakhus ApS, completed on 1 July 2025. Both companies supply wood pellets to Danish customers, and the transaction met the applicable notification thresholds. Brødr. Ewers contacted the DCCA in October 2025, after which the transaction was notified and cleared without intervention on 16 January 2026. The DCCA's decision addresses the period between completion and notification, during which the notification and standstill requirements had not yet been complied with. The DCCA has not yet decided whether to pursue a sanction in relation to this period.

Takeaway: The JobTeam matter is a reminder that a dawn raid can produce a fine entirely of the company's own making – separate from, and on top of, whatever the underlying investigation ultimately shows. The DCCA treated the deletions as obstruction regardless of the fact that the data was recovered, and gave no weight to the explanation that the employee had acted in panic. The exposure arose within about half an hour, from a single employee's account, and it turned on how the inspection was handled rather than on the merits of the case.

The practical point for companies is that this risk is dealt with by preparing for it. Put a dawn raid manual in place, make sure reception and staff know the first-response steps when inspectors arrive, and refresh training regularly – with the non-negotiable rule front and centre: nothing is deleted, moved or altered once an inspection has begun.

The Brødr. Ewers case is a reminder that the notification and standstill requirements in merger control are assessed separately from the underlying substantive question: the transaction itself was cleared without intervention, but this did not affect the DCCA's assessment of the earlier notification period.

Read more here (JobTeam) and here (Brødr. Ewers).

QUESTIONS? For questions or further discussion, please do not hesitate to contact Schjødt's EU & Competition team: