The EU and the Nordic region: A new approach to IP and technology in defence procurement

Defence procurement is already subject to special rules designed to take account of national security, preparedness, and classified information. In practice, this means that the defence sector, for example, has greater freedom to invite only selected suppliers, impose stricter security clearance requirements, shield information related to tenders, and depart from the principles of open competition. Such exceptions follow from Article 123 of the EEA Agreement and the corresponding provision in Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Directive 2009/81/EC for defence and security procurement covers most cases, making it unnecessary to apply the treaty provisions directly. In Norwegian, the Public Procurement Act, the Utilities Regulations, the Defence and Security Procurement Regulations, and the Security Act regulates this area. In addition, there are several sector-specific rules such as defence materiel regulations, internal instructions and regulations within the Armed Forces, and NATO-specific procurement rules where procurement is partly handled through intergovernmental agreements.

However, the regulation is primarily aimed at ensuring orderly and transparent procurement procedures rather than enabling faster lead time and more efficient purchasing linked to modernisation and rapid adaptation capable of strengthening defence capability. Recent signals from EU, including the roadmap mentioned above, signals a shift in directions. At the same time, geopolitical changes are driving a strong willingness for cooperation between Norway in a Nordic context and at the European level. These developments are expected to be reflected in new regulations, programme rules, and contractual terms in EU-funded projects relevant to Norway. Norway’s also participates in the European Defence Fund (EDF) though its EEA affiliation, allowing Norwegian actors to take part in EDF projects subject to the EDF regulatory framework and ownership and control requirements.  Norway's close integrated into the European market means that a range of related areas are also likely to be affected. Norway procure defence solutions from European suppliers, while Norwegian companies are tightly integrated into the European value and production chain. Standards and architectural choices are often set at EU level and will therefore impact Norway’s choice of solutions in practice.

Project approach 

The Norwegian and European model for defence procurement has traditionally been characterised by a process divided into a series of sequential stages, each requiring considerable time and resources. A typical development process begins with a need to analyse and define the operational requirements, which form the basis for assessing different alternatives capable of meeting the need. Typical examples are upgrades of existing equipment, purchasing new off-the-shelf equipment, developing new solutions, or transitioning to new platforms. Typically, this initial phase also involves evaluating factors such as risk, timelines, and key metrics in line with standard project methodology.

Once a preferred solution and key procurement parameters are in place, a project organisation is established as needed. A detailed specification, preliminary budget and timeline is prepared. For larger projects, political approval is required and the contractual framework is defined to support the tender process and future negotiations.

The procurement is then tendered nationally or internationally, initiating a complex bid evaluation phase where factors such as price, quality, and delivery time are thoroughly assessed. Terms are negotiated before a final agreement is signed. The regulatory framework sets requirements on how the relevant parameters are weighted and how the process is conducted to ensure fair competition.

The procurement then moves into a development or production phase involving suppliers. This requires ongoing follow-up on agreed milestones and cost levels. Training is often required upon delivery, and equipment and personnel must be integrated into existing structures. The subsequent operational phase involves not only maintenance and upgrades throughout the lifecycle, but also evaluations based on the original definition of needs and the purpose of the procurement.

Lead times and adaptability

The procurement process, where one process follows another in a standard project sequence results in an enormous amount of time from the needs are identified until delivery. In a larger procurement, the initial concept phase will usually require 3–5 years. The development phase can be expected to take 5–7 years, followed by or overlapping with a production phase that also extends over several years. It is not uncommon for strategically significant procurements to have a time horizon of 10–15 years.

This approach has functioned reasonably well when the threats have been relatively stable and predictable, and when technological development moved more slowly. Hardware was the main focus, with heavy mechanical and physical infrastructure linked to stationary bases and rigid formations for conventional warfare. Larger defence systems were platform-oriented and based on large groupings of costly aircraft, ships, and vehicles. In this context, “platform” refer to capability being built around a basic platform capable of performing different missions, partly through flexibility within the platform itself and partly through integration or cooperation with other platforms.

Example: Frigates

An example of such a platform is the Fridtjof Nansen-class frigate in the Norwegian Navy. Delivered in 2006–2011, the five frigates reportedly represented the largest investment in Norwegian defence history at the time. These frigates perform a central function in the Norwegian Navy, with operational capabilities directed at submarines, airspace, and surface vessels. Equipped with the AEGIS weapons system, integrated helicopter capacity, and interchangeable weapons systems, this platform provides flexibility and interoperability with other defence solutions. AEGIS, originally developed in the 1970s, integrated weapons system with built-in radar capable of tracking more than 100 simultaneous targets. The system was designed to provide functionality ranging from tracking to destruction and has been regularly updated with new technology.

The replacement of the older Oslo-class frigates from the 1960s was initiated as a separate project in 1992, approved by the parliament in 1999, with a contract concluded in 2000. A later report from the Office of the Auditor General identified persistent delivery challenges as the technology was already outdated upon delivery. The solutions could no longer be regarded as optimal and spare parts proved difficult to obtain. At a parliamentary hearing, the then Inspector General of the Navy (now "Chief of the Navy"), Lars Saunes, explained:

“When we bought the frigates, they were based on technology from the 1980s and 1990s. The initial spare parts package focused on obtaining spare parts for the unique systems manufactured at that time. Those systems are no longer produced today. Part of the issue is that when you cannot find ‘spare parts for a TV’, you buy a new one. That is what we are facing now. The systems produced in the 1980s and 1990s are no longer manufactured by anyone. So we have to ‘replace those TVs’ before we can buy the spare parts. In some areas this is a highly complex system. In some cases, we are almost on eBay trying to find spare parts.”

While this did not apply to all systems, it illustrates how solutions that appear sound on paper may be outdated by delivery when technology and battlespace evolve rapidly. Upgrades may also require taking frigates out of service, creating tactical capability gaps and complicating operations. Over time, lagging technology may become a strategic challenge. Given Norway’s proximity to the Kola Peninsula, frigates must remain technologically advanced enough to detect and track submarines within their areas of responsibility, both for national security and to meet NATO obligations.

This example highlights how long lead times have significant implications even within the traditional defence paradigm. If we add fact that military technology and warfare are rapidly evolving, it is easy to conclude that we are facing major challenges.

Supersonic missiles travelling at five times the speed of sound and capable of highly manoeuvrable and precise strikes drastically reduce the reaction time available to defence systems. Unmanned surface or underwater vessels can target ships, installations, and land-based infrastructure. Drone swarms have matured into credible threats against vessels. Electronic warfare has become more sophisticated, capable of disrupting sensor systems and communication solutions. Digital systems, if insufficiently protected, may introduce vulnerabilities rather than advantages. These capabilities are often significantly cheaper and require far less infrastructure and logistical support than traditional platforms like frigates. To meet these challenges, tomorrow’s frigates must not only be equipped with solutions capable of countering such threats; but be designed for interoperability with new systems, flexibility, scalability, and rapid adaptation to evolving requirements.

While this example focuses on frigates, the fundamental idea of changing significantly in how we think about defence procurement applies generally to this type of acquisition.

A changing world – historical perspective

The premise of this article is the profound technological shift we are seeing in the military field. This creates a clear need to adapt to ensure that our national defence—and that of our allies—remains at an acceptable level. It is often said that history repeats itself, and military history is in part a history of innovations, and in part adapting to external change. 

The Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates were the largest defence investment of their time. My great-grandfather, however, served on one of the four Norwegian armoured cruisers that Norway commissioned around the turn of the previous century. The last ships were launched in 1899, and together they cost NOK 19 million, corresponding to one-fifth of the state budget at the time. The national budget for 2026 indicates an expenditure level of approximately NOK 2,200 billion, with a correspondingly higher one-fifth share.

More interesting than budget shares, however, is the technological development during this period. The screw propeller was patented by Josef Ressel in 1827, and by the time the Norge-class armoured cruisers were in place in 1899, the navy had transitioned from sail to steam power. In 1884, Charles Parsons developed the steam turbine, replacing steam engines used a mechanical piston to transmit power with turbine rotor that provided direct power transmission with less vibration and smoother operation. This enabled warships to travel 3–5 knots faster. 

The steam turbine transformed naval vessels almost immediately. By 1906, the British Dreadnought class appeared - ships powered by steam turbines that moved far faster than earlier vessels. The innovation made it possible to build larger ships carrying heavier guns, redefining what a warship could be: larger, faster, and more heavily armed. The Norwegian armoured cruisers had two main guns; HMS Dreadnought carried ten. Its ability to control combat distance, combined with the longer range of its artillery, made it practically unbeatable. Within a few years, the Norwegian armoured cruisers were technologically outclassed. Nevertheless, these smaller armoured ships were fully functional and well suited to Norwegian waters and the intended operational conditions. Simply put, competing with such vessels was never Norway’s task, as it required enormous investment and a substantial industrial base.

In 1892, Rudolf Diesel was granted the German patent DRP 67207 for the internal combustion engine. The transition to marine diesel engines then gradually progressed, initially in smaller vessels and submarines. Even around 1900, technological changes were already reshaping defence solutions.

This pattern is well known from classical texts of antiquity. Polybius recounts how Carthage, with its powerful war fleet, dominated the Mediterranean in the First Punic War, while the Romans lacked comparable ships. By chance, the Carthaginians lost a vessel that the Romans used as a model for designing their own ships, an early example of reverse engineering. It is described how the Romans started entirely from scratch, training rowers on benches built on land while the ships were under construction. In some retellings, the captured ship is described as a trireme, but Polybius identifies it as a quinquereme. The exact distinction is debated: the trireme had three vertical levels of rowers, while the quinquereme refers to "five", likely indicating the number of rowers rather than the number of oars. The prevailing theory is that there were three vertical levels of oars, but that the two upper levels had two rowers each. 

In any case, this was a large and complex warship that the Romans could not realistically have built without assistance or prior experience. Without the captured ship, developing such a design would have taken far longer. The arrangement of three vertical levels and five rowers per oar group imposed strict demands on weight, balance, and geometry, all of which had to be integrated into the ship’s overall structure. Carthaginian vessels also featured complicating elements, including a large bronze ram at the bow for striking enemy ships.

The Romans did not merely copy. They introduced the corvus, a boarding bridge that could be dropped onto an adjacent ship to enable rapid boarding by soldiers. This adaptation allowed disciplined, battle-hardened soldiers to board quickly and win the engagement, showing that the Romans refined the design to exploit their own strengths. A dynamic interplay between new technologies and subsequent adaptation is a fundamental starting point for any defence force. Such paradigm shifts are neither new nor unexpected. What is new, however, is the speed of development and how it cuts across established platforms, structures, and branches of service.

“New Defence” players

In its new roadmap, the Commission places strong emphasis on facilitating innovation and renewal, drawing heavily on lessons learned from the ongoing war in Ukraine:

“The war in Ukraine is demonstrating how rapidly defence technologies evolve and can alter battlefield dynamics. SMEs, small mid-caps, startups, and scaleups, often with a civilian deep-tech background, are central to Ukraine’s defence by swiftly delivering critical capabilities to the armed forces. Innovation and adaptation cycles are becoming increasingly shorter. High tech and complex systems are combined with low-cost and mass-manufactured products. Disruptive technologies such as AI, quantum, cyber, and space-based systems are providing rapid tactical change on the battlefield.”

The aim is not to replace traditional defence procurement, but to facilitate hybrid solutions and cooperation across the military and civilian technology environments. It is not enough merely to modernise the EU defence industry; space must also be created for so-called “New Defence players”, i.e. new market participants. These are businesses that are to be incentivised and incorporated into broader and more coordinated cooperation. Three objectives are highlighted to facilitate such a change:
 

1. Strengthen links between the defence sector and deep-tech environments to accelerate breakthrough innovations and the emergence of new defence actors, attract expertise and talent, and increase the benefit of so-called “spin-in” from civilian technology environments;
    
2. Accelerate the integration of advanced technologies into the Member States' military capabilities to achieve European defence readiness and effective deterrence; and 
    
3. Strengthen Europe’s defence production capacity through innovative and advanced industrial manufacturing solutions, so that capacity can be delivered rapidly, at sufficient scale, and in a cost-effective manner. 
    

These are ambitious objectives that require change across all stages of procurement and system development. What is envisioned here are deliveries that, in practice, never truly end. Updates and adaptations continue throughout the system’s lifetime. Software and AI are not updated periodically, but continuously both centrally and through real-time system learning and data exchange.

Just as Norwegian armoured cruisers could not compete with HMS Dreadnought in 1906, it is unrealistic to expect Norway match the military scale of powers such as the United States or China today. Nor is that the goal. Future development must build on our commitment to being present and relevant within our own geographical and strategical context. This means maintaining patrol and control of our sea areas and northern borders, ensuring reception and supply arrangements for allied forces and strengthening protection against attacks on strategic infrastructure. This requires improved countermeasures against drones, high-speed missiles, and autonomous systems as well as stronger protection of digital integrity and countermeasures against cyber threats.

As we have seen above, defence is to a large extent an art of adaptation. Defence capability must be adapted to realistica threat scenarios. There is little value in building a large and powerful defence against land-based attacks if the actual threat lies in supersonic missiles and drones directed at infrastructure. In our case, this means first and foremost that the EU, the Nordic region, and Norway must strengthen the overall defence capability, and that this must in turn be optimised in light of the geographical and strategic characteristics of each country. The key challenge is balancing national defence needs with contributions to regional cooperation.   For example, Norway must maintainits own national defence, patrol the High North, and contribute forces to international missions and training operations with allied partners. In all the above-mentioned areas, it is natural to look to Russia’s military capability when it comes to concrete adaptation, countermeasures, and resource allocation. This is perhaps the most important point in upgrading military capability: identifying what one is actually preparing for. For Norway and Europe, this has taken a long time, even after the Crimea invasion in 2014. Only after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 did Russia's central role in European defence policy assessments become fully clear. A defence not built and scaled to withstand Russia has little relevance in Europe today.

Design authority and intellectual property

The roadmap emphasises the need for European control over “design authority”, including access to technical data and the ability to further develop systems without restrictions from third countries. The control described here must be assumed to include, among other things, the architecture and interfaces of the system, configuration management, changes and upgrades, integration of new components and software, and access to necessary documentation, technical data, and rights or licences. There is little doubt that software and the use of AI will be central to future EU discussions on defence solutions. The Commission states the following on the strategic importance AI is expected to have:

“AI is a strategic driver of military innovation. The future battlefield will be marked as much by algorithms and data as by kinetic capabilities.”

It is emphasised that AI in this context is not limited to direct combat solutions such as drones, anti-drone systems, air defence, precision strike capabilities and the like, but also includes command functions, logistics, and combat-ready VR solutions.

In such a technology-oriented context, tensions may easily arise in relation to standard contractual provisions on intellectual property rights and the governance of technology that is to be supplied or developed. Procurement contracts define ownership of developed or implemented technology, while licences regulate use and access. Escrow arrangement may be required to secure access to source code and critical documentation in case of supplier default or emergencies. Dual-use rights, meaning rights to technology supplied for both civilian and military purposes, will in principle be regulated differently according to purpose and the needs of the end customer.

These examples only touch the surface of the existing regime, and a number of adjustments must be expected if the adaptability referred to in the EU roadmap is to be achieved. A central challenge will be to facilitate greater interoperability between components and modules, opening the door to new and more creative thinking on how different solutions can be connected or shared to achieve tactical advantages tailored to specific situations or plans. Here we see that costly lessons from the war in Ukraine are being given considerable weight by the Commission:

“Modularity and open architectures are key to rapidly reconfigure, upgrade, or integrate defence systems, drawing on commercially available interoperable technologies. Ukraine has been facing the challenge of adapting received weapon systems with limited interoperability to platforms in their inventory. This experience highlights the importance of embedding interoperability and modularity by design, embracing more flexible, scalable, faster and futureproof approaches that ensure weapon systems can rapidly adapt to changing needs. It also underlines the importance of maintaining control over the design authority of defence systems, enabling rapid adaptation and use free of foreign restrictions.”

This marks a clear shift away from the traditional hardware focus that has characterised defence procurements. We see that the EU wishes to place greater emphasis on modularity, open architecture, and design authority. To achieve this in full, intellectual property rights must be treated as a core contractual component from the outset. Effective IP governance must not only optimise commercial interests but also ensure that defence systems can be easily reconfigured, upgraded, and integrated with other solutions quickly and with minimal legal or technical barriers.

This requires robust systems for documenting technology development, ownership, and financing as well as systematic follow-up of IP obligations, clearance, license scope, and associated limitations on use and subsequent modifications. As development can be expected to take place in parallel across multiple countries, we must also allocate resources to handling export control and foreign restrictions on technology.

A shift connected to several of these elements is already underway across various stages of defence supply.  We see this in the arena of dual-use technology, where companies from the civilian sector are entering the defence market. At the same time, access to technology, data, and IP is becoming more tightly controlled. Ensuring critical supply chains in this new landscape is emerging as a matter of national concern, while digital services and software development must also be secured. In this context, AI stands out as an important factor, and major changes are expected in the way the defence sector allocates resources and investments going forward. AI will be able to provide a form of information dominance, together with associated analytical and mapping capability in both the short and long term. To achieve this, clear regulation of data collaboration will be required, clarifying what may be shared and how this can be done in a secure and efficient way. Likewise, the framework for test environments and so-called “sandboxes” where digital solutions can be evaluated during the course of development, must be clarified. Since new actors are expected to enter an unfamiliar field, clear boundaries and requirements must be established early in the contractual process. In practice, this will require precise tender and qualification documentation, together with associated security assessments. In addition, systems and procedures will be needed to carry out due diligence-type assessments of the supplier’s IP portfolio and rights control quickly.

At the same time, suppliers must retain protection of trade secrets and IP, which remain central to competitiveness. Full patenting is often neither feasible nor desirable, as it may expose sensitive information. The parties must therefore find practical ways of addressing such issues. Importantly, “the parties” now extend beyond a single customer–supplier relationship to include multiple, interdependent actors. While this more dynamic cooperation is promising, it introduces significant contractual challenges in striking the right balance. Access to source code and compliance with national security regulations are recurring issues in such agreements. New actors will not be ready to meet the formal requirements and routines that must be in place, making it important to develop clear guidelines and templates that enable companies to adapt quickly to more agile contractual deliveries.

Agile procurement

The Commission proposes a pilot for agile and rapid defence innovation, where activities are organized as challenges with lead times of 6–12 months where more risk is deliberately accepted than in traditional procurement programmes. At the same time, the roadmap explains that this type of ordering requires a “complete redefinition of value” moving away from the principle of lowest cost and towards long-term industrial strength, technological sovereignty, and competence-building. It is stressed that this concerns not only the cost picture, but the fundamental understanding of what is actually being ordered and purchased:

“To fundamentally resolve these challenges, the EU must pivot from viewing procurement as a transactional process of buying products to a strategic act of investing in industrial capacity and resilience.”

This reflects a normative shift in how the EU wishes to approach the procurement process and defence capacity. The process itself is intended to create incentives and mechanisms for strengthening the supplier base. The underlying idea resembles Norway's strategy of building a national supplier industry in the oil sector with distinctive expertise and accumulated knowledge. The approach is not unknown in traditional procurement. In the frigate acquisition from Spain, it was said that Norway had entered into “one of the best offset agreements ever”. The agreement involved more than 250 Norwegian companies, and by 2007 the Spanish shipyard had already fulfilled its offset obligations amounting to NOK 10.6 billion. In addition, the Spanish defence sector purchased defence materiel from Norway worth more than NOK 3 billion as part of the reciprocal obligations under the agreement.

The key difference is that procurement should focus less on the transactional aspect and more on building capacity and resilience in the supplierbase. Such an approach aligns with the Norwegian model of building supplier competence over time. This ensures diversity, development, and access to expertise and material, all of which are expected to be important factors in the future development of defence capability. The contractual relationship will not, to the same extent, end upon delivery, but will instead involve a lifecycle commitment encompassing further development and innovation. To support this, the contractual framework must include obligations relating to upgrades, technological development, contingency capacity, access to spare parts, maintenance capabilities, and so on. In practice, this will entail greater use of long-term framework agreements with clauses on automatic renewal. We must also expect such agreements to include option structures allowing for future capacity increases and integration with other systems. The contractual terms will be more far-reaching than those of traditional procurement contracts, where both delivery and the entire contractual relationship will be regulated. In addition to what has already been mentioned, a range of other factors will need to be incorporated into such contracts: requirements for “surge capacity”, enabling rapid scaling of volume and production; sharing or at least clear allocation of development costs and the corresponding rights; options on future production volume; and similar elements implying forms of public-private partnership of the kind attempted in larger infrastructure projects in recent years. This model also allows for consortium-based supplier constellations tailored to the specific project or delivery, and joint ventures.

Obvious advantages of the approach include the building of long-term competence and a stronger basis for significant investments. At the same time, this model must include mechanisms for control and assessments of tender documentation and transparency.

As of today, Norway has not adopted any new legislation or instructions that expressly transform defence procurement into strategic investment in industrial capacity and resilience. However, the existing procurement framework combined with national security exceptions, already provides considerable flexibility to design contracts in line with these ambitions. The key difference from the EU’s vision is that a shift can largely be achieved through contractual design and administrative governance, rather than new legislation. To achieve this, merely changing project methodology and contractual documentation would not be sufficient. It requires going back to the definition of the operational need, breaking them down into fundamental elements of the various defence systems. These must then, conceptually, be rebuilt from the ground up, based on modular solutions that can easily be replaced, repaired, upgraded, and connected—physically or digitally—to achieve functional interoperability with other modules or systems.

For example, a system with strong missile-tracking capabilities should be able to share data with other units within a given geographical area. Other units could then draw on this information without needing equivalent systems themselves resulting in cheaper, lighter, and more robust structures. Multiple geographically dispersed units would be able to share data and use it to triangulate dynamic positions, improve accuracy, and ensure redundancy. Instead of each unit aiming at precisely the same point, an intentional spread could increase the likelihood of neutralising incoming objects. This would improve accuracy even against extremely fast and manoeuvrable missiles, drones, or similar threats. Aggregate data can be fed into centralised AI units that continuously analyse the data to coordinate and optimise response and defence, while also conducting tactical assessments in real time. Rapid instructions concerning countermeasures could be issued in parallel with ongoing updates and risk assessments. The information could also be used for subsequent analysis of attacks and defensive measures to make later adjustments making the system a “living” system, capable of continuous adaptable over time.

The F-35 Lightning II already performs several of these functions, operating as part of a network-based defence system where sensors and collected data are fused and presented in a single consolidated situational picture. The information is shared with other F-35s in the group, as well as with air defence units and cooperating ships and ground forces. A development project leading to such a product is extremely demanding, as it requires breadth and integration far beyond what we are accustomed to in ordinary military equipment. The goal must therefore be to develop more affordable solutions based on modularity and shared interfaces.

The flexibility and “agility” is already present in current regulations and guidelines may be of advantage for Norway as we enter a period of larger budgets, greater demands, and a changed landscape in defence procurement. However, this will not happen by itself. The first, and perhaps greatest, challenge concerns culture and established patterns of action. It will be a major challenge to implement the changes required for rapid adaptation to current demands and the new military reality. There is an established mindset about how things are to be done—based exclusively on the traditional model described above. This is a hard paradigm, built within a system in which command structure and chain of command are naturally well entrenched. To this one may add the particularly Norwegian fear of doing something wrong, of not getting it entirely right. If Norway is to achieve the changes suggested in this article, we have to dare experimenting to some extent. There is no clear formula that will guarantee success in every case.

In a new landscape, it cannot be forbidden to stumble occasionally provided there is oversight and lessons learned. The traditional approach has been to eliminate as much risk as possible before decisions are made and contracts entered into, as seen in the Nansen frigate project during its first ten years (1990–2001). Here, as advisers on various forms of contract, we note a strong contrast with modern IT and technology projects, where risk reduction occurs continuously through learning and, to some extent, through mistakes made along the way. For example, Proof of Concept (PoC) is often used to test a critical hypothesis or idea. Instead of fully planning and designing towards the goal, the component in question is isolated and tested on a limited scale at low cost. This shortens the path to the goal and provides great learning value. If it fails, that is itself an important lesson. In addition, one will usually gain an understanding of why it does not work and assess changes to the design or adapt the end goal in light of that knowledge. In this respect, we might be a little like Thomas Edison, who remarked: “I have not failed. I've just found 10,000 ways that won't work.”

In practice, development projects require a degree of tailoring to function optimally, but this is not a subjective or random process. There are robust and established principles for structuring agile projects. Typically, projects are divided into smaller deliveries with shorter, more intensive milestones, combined with continuous improvements and adjustments. This requires close follow-up by both customer and supplier. The delivery description, which in the past might have been developed over several years in a separate pre-project, must be more flexible and based on the expectation of changes along the way. The delivery must therefore be described from a functional and operational perspective rather than in terms of detailed and fixed specifications. As a result, there may be a shift away from fixed specifications and fixed prices towards partial budgets and timelines with more variable content. Instead of delivering a complete system after many years, components are delivered incrementally, tested, and adjusted along the way. This also means that a larger procurement will be divided into smaller modules and work packages. In many cases, it may be sensible to establish framework agreements with several suppliers that can cooperate running over several years with call-offs based on evolving priorities.

Conclusion

There is also growing movement towards closer Nordic defence cooperation. While the Nordic countries are often seen as relatively similar, there are clear historical and political differences. Norway has long-standing NATO experience, including responsibilities such as monitoring Russian ship and submarine traffic. Sweden was long neutral and joined NATO only recently. Finland has maintained a more active relationship to its own defence due to its proximity and history with Russia and has also recently joined NATO. Iceland is geographically distant from continental Europe but closely linked to the United States and to defence cooperation through NATO. Denmark, meanwhile, is a longstanding NATO ally, geographically close to continental Europe and has recently received attention due to political statements in the United States concerning Greenland. 

These differences may be an advantage as each country brings different experiences and needs into the years ahead. This can help identify effective solutions for developing national, Nordic, and European defence capabilities. In recent years, Nordic cooperation has been further strengthened through a move towards a common defence market with integrated systems and solutions. In this context, the Nordic region as a defence alliance may hold an advantage: as small actors characterised by strong mutual loyalty and trust, we have an opportunity to help shape a new model for defence based on modern project and contracting principles.